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conservative force of the American Bar has been the greatest safeguard of American institutions in the past, but there is equal truth in the aphorism of Lord Bacon,—a man, as Coleridge says in quoting the remark, ‘assuredly sufficiently acquainted with the extent of secret and personal influence,’ that, ‘the knowledge of the speculative principles of men in general between the ages of twenty and thirty is the one great source of political prophecy.’

In accepting the building on behalf of the Faculty of the Department of Law, William Draper Lewis, the Dean of the Faculty, said :

“ Mr. Provost: A little over three years ago the Faculty of Law expressed to you, and through you to the Trustees, their earnest desire that there should be erected near the other University Buildings a permanent home for the Department. To-day you call upon us to occupy, exclusively for the purposes of the Law School, the most complete educational building in the country. To say that we deeply appreciate this more than generous response to our request is to express but feebly the feeling which stirs us at this moment.

When the University determined to erect a building for our Department, the Provost asked us to submit to him a detailed statement of the requirements of such a building. This request was complied with, and though these “ requirements ” necessarily involved a much larger building than any one had up to that time contemplated, we were not asked to modify our plans in the slightest detail. The architects, Messrs. Cope & Stewardson, were directed to prepare plans which should meet every want of the faculty. I need hardly tell you that they have done so. Indeed, if our successors find defects in the general interior arrangement of this building, in the distribution of the reading and lecture rooms, we of the faculty are alone responsible, for neither trouble nor money has been spared by the University in its efforts to give us all that we asked.

On this occasion, as we are about to occupy this building,

which has been dedicated by you, Mr. Dickson, to the cause of legal education and to the memory of those who in their time knew and loved the law, it is perhaps proper that I, as representing the faculty, should tell the friends of the University and the representatives of legal learning gathered here something of our educational ideal. If I were asked to state the thought which is uppermost in the minds of the faculty, shaping not only our acts as a body, but our individual work as teachers, I should reply: The thought that our chief aim is to enable our students to become efficient lawyers. I can therefore best give you a mental picture of our educational ideal if I show you what we mean by an efficient lawyer.

Some there are who tell us that we should try to make our teaching practical, others that we should confine ourselves to fundamental principles. The one regards the law as an art, and likes the word practical; the other regards the law as a science, and is fond of such expressions as 'grounded in the theory of the law.' It may surprise some of you to hear me say that our faculty has never discussed the question whether we should regard the law from the point of view of an art or of a science. We have never discussed this question because we are united in the thought that a system of legal education which pretended to give the principles of law, disassociated from their practical application, would be as useless as a system which confined the student to copying legal papers. All of us admit that law is a science. But it is a living science; one that is applied every day to the affairs of living men; and a science whose principles have been hammered out, not in the closet of the recluse, but in the effort to decide real controversies between man and man. Its rules have sprung from multitudinous instances. They are one of the results of the facts which make up our history. As the law has grown, so is it being developed. Even as I speak, hundreds of courts in this country and in England and her colonies, are consciously or unconsciously modifying the principles of our law by the effort to apply them to new controversies. If our economic and social development should cease, and we should become a static people, and the new cases in our courts were

always identical with some other reported case, law would cease to be a science. It would become merely an art, and would be no more interesting than the science of civil engineering, provided every bridge that was built was the duplication of some existing bridge. Again, if man should stop disputing with his fellow-man, the study of the law would be the study of purely historical phenomena. But in our complex, developing modern life new legal problems are arising every day. The law is not merely the study of phenomena connected with a bygone people. The law is a living science and a present art, and therefore there is no such thing as a practical as distinguished from a theoretical lawyer. There are only two kinds of lawyers, the efficient and the inefficient. If you can find a man whose only accomplishment is that he can draw a deed, provided you do not wish to accomplish something he has not seen done before, you may find a man who is useful occasionally to do your conveyancing, but you do not find an efficient lawyer who can talk to you by the hour on the advantages of codification, or on the comparative excellencies of the civil and the common law, or on the early courts in Rome; but cannot take the facts of a case between Jones and Smith, and give reasons which would appeal to a court why one or the other is right, then you may have found a man who is full of entertaining information, but again you have not found an efficient lawyer; you have not found the man which it is the desire of our faculty to graduate.

In our minds, the efficient lawyer is not merely the so-called practical man, and on the other hand not merely the so-called theoretical one. He is the man who can do well the work which the lawyer is called upon to do. He is one who can take the jumble of facts which his client calls a clear statement of the case, and see quickly and accurately the legal point or points on which the case will turn, and with this knowledge as a starting point, be able to get the facts before the court, and having done so, prepare his brief and argue intelligently the legal questions in his case. We believe that a system of legal education which trains him for part of this duty and not the other, is radically deficient. Our aim is to give the student a knowledge which will not only enable him

to argue a legal point, but which will enable him to bring a suit and prepare and try a case; not primarily because we believe that a knowledge of what is called practice is a necessary addition to a knowledge of the fundamental principles of law in order that a man may become a practicing member of the bar, but because we also believe that as the law is a science grown up from actual cases, and applied and still growing by application to actual cases, a knowledge of ancient pleading and modern practice is essential in order that the student may understand the fundamental principles of the law.

It may be asked, do all your students expect to practice law? Have you no place for one who wants to write on law or teach some branch of the law or legal history? Certainly we have a place for such a man. But we believe that his training should not, in the main, be different from the training of the man who intends to argue cases in court. The work of the lawyer in the preparation of his case, of the judge called upon to decide it, or of the writer or teacher who must compare it with earlier cases, criticise and explain it, is essentially the same. Each must examine the same books and face the solution of the same problems. To succeed in their respective spheres, the writer and teacher, no less than the judge or practitioner, must realize that he is dealing with an applied science. To grasp the exact meaning of a legal decision, he must thoroughly understand the mechanical forms, that is, the pleadings under which the case was presented to the court. He also must be familiar with the practical difficulties of proving certain classes of facts. In other words, we do not believe that one can intelligently teach or write on the law which his scholars or readers must apply in a real world, without a knowledge of the conditions under which the principles he discusses must be applied. And therefore, in saying that our chief desire is to graduate "efficient lawyers," we do not slight the man who comes to us to prepare himself for research work or teaching; but in trying to make him also an efficient lawyer, we take the only course which can make him an efficient student of the law.

While a knowledge of the theory and practice of the law forms the extent of the systematic teaching in our present

undergraduate course, I should leave you with a false impression if I were to allow you to go away with the idea that we think there are no other elements in the make-up of an efficient lawyer besides the training of his brain and hand. In law, as in all other departments of human endeavor, the efficient man must possess elements of character as well as intellectual and mechanical endowments. He must have in his character certain moral elements, and at least two other elements which I think we may also include under the designation of moral.

One of these elements of character we may call method or perseverance, according to the form of its manifestation. Whether we call it method or perseverance we cannot overestimate its importance. If a lawyer is not neat he hampers his own progress; if he cannot systematize his work, great success, except in rare instances, is denied to him; unless he is capable of long continued and persistent effort, he may never hope to obtain even a moderately respectable position at the bar. We cannot teach here directly and in a separate course, neatness, order, perseverance, but by holding this element of character before ourselves as essential to the real efficiency of our graduates, we can, and I believe do, accomplish something in this direction. Not alone with this object, but by no means wholly in disregard of it, we make our course and our examinations such that all our students understand that to obtain a good position in the class, or even to get through our course at all, there must be persistent work every day during the term, and that in each week the work must be systematized; to each day being given its allotted portion. Three years of such training, while it does not make all of our graduates paragons of neatness, method or persistence, undoubtedly has a distinct tendency to mold into the character this element, which, equally with knowledge and skill, is essential to efficiency.

There is a second element of character, very different from that to which I have just called your attention, but none the less essential. This is the element of mental independence in legal thinking. Mental timidity must not be confounded with the caution which very properly keeps a client out of a contest the issue of which is doubtful.

But the lawyer who for his legal opinions leans on his digest, his text-book, or his friend, wins only the cases which no one could help winning. Now independence of thought can no more be taught as a separate course than neatness or perseverance. Some have it naturally, others acquire it only by much persistence on the part of the teacher; others, again, no matter what is done for them, never acquire it. But we believe that it is true in law, as in other things, that much can be accomplished by the teacher if he is distinctly conscious of the importance of developing in his students the power to think for themselves. Therefore, in our teaching here, we encourage the student to work out the problems of the law for himself. Where there is a real opportunity for a difference of opinion, we are frankly indifferent as to whether he agrees with us or not, provided he can maintain his own opinion with legal reasons. The old idea that a teacher is a modern Gama-lial, at whose feet the student is to sit and drink in information without question, if it ever existed in this Department, has gone, and I trust gone forever. Each of us teaches by that method which appeals to him as best; some lecture, some use in part a text-book, some the so-called case-method; but the mental attitude of each of us towards our classes is, I believe, the same. It is that of the man who invites on the part of his students discussion, public or private, of the subjects in his course; it is that of the man who is making the distinct effort to give his students the power to think for themselves.

There is one other element in our concept of efficiency, harder to define, perhaps, but more important than all the others. From one point of view, it is the moral makeup of the man, from another it is his mental attitude towards the law. All departments of the University are striving to turn out men who will lead clean and honest lives. I believe the whole tendency of our life at Pennsylvania, as in other universities, is in this direction. Our dormitory system, our athletics, our Houston Club and our various student organizations, fill that portion of the daily life of our students not given to study with wholesome mental and physical occupation, and are important factors in the upbuilding of their character. Our work as a Faculty of Law, as we conceive it, is to

take the foundation of good morals which is, in an ever increasing degree, laid for us in the character of the great majority of our students by home and university influences, and build thereon something which will make our graduates, not only moral men, but moral lawyers. A man rightly is considered moral when he has certain general positive and negative qualities; if he is temperate in his life, honest in his business dealings, kind to those dependent on him, and considerate of his fellow men. It is our thought that a lawyer should be all this and more. Perhaps this "more" can be summed up in a single sentence: He should love the law and guard her. If he does this, slovenly and inaccurate work, careless legal advice will be impossible to him; the etiquette of the profession he will guard with jealous care; he will keep his own actions on a high plane, and place under the ban of wholesome disdain those who sully the high traditions of the Bar.

How can a law school teach affection and reverence towards the law and the profession thereof? By formal courses in legal ethics? We do not think so. Can nothing therefore be done in this direction by a law faculty? That is the opposite error. There is a subtle thing which all teachers know as the atmosphere of a school. There always is an atmosphere. It may be very good, or very bad, or neither one nor the other. This mental atmosphere, in part, is left by those who have graduated; in part it is the effect of the mental attitude towards his coming work, brought by the incoming student, and in a great part it is the character of the teachers, the efficiency of the school taken as a whole, and the dignity and decorum of its surroundings. I need hardly tell you that, following the example of our predecessors, we of the present faculty have labored and are laboring, with the efficient assistance of large numbers of our students, to make this mental and moral atmosphere of which I have been speaking such that our graduates may not only be skilled in the theory and practice of the law may not only have in a greater measure than they had on entering, method in work, perseverance in endeavor, and independence in thought, but also that they may have a deep love and enthusiasm for the law, which will

abide with them throughout their lives, shielding them from all temptation to do anything which would tend to bring her or them as lawyers into disrepute.

Over the main staircase of this building, so as to be seen by one about to leave it, is to be carved the words of the great Judge whose unselfish labors created this Department of the University. They are the words of George Sharswood: 'Truth, simplicity and candor, these are the cardinal virtues of a lawyer.' Let us hope that each new man, as he takes up the work of teaching here, will consider well the labors for the cause of legal education of such men as he who framed this sentence, of such men as Morris, as Mitchell, and as Hare. These men not only taught their students the law, but impressed them with some of the dignity of their own character and their own devotion to the profession. We, and those who will take up our work when we lay it down, by following the example of their devotion, may perhaps also be able to write in the hearts of our students those three all-embracing words—'truth,—simplicity,—candor.'"